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Abstract
Paul Pietroski has developed a powerful minimalist and internalist alter-
native to standard compositional semantics, where meanings are identified
with instructions to fetch or assemble human concepts in specific ways.
In particular, there appears to be no need for Fregean Function Applica-
tion, as natural language composition only involves processes of combin-
ing monadic or dyadic concepts, and Pietroski’s theory can then, allegedly,
avoid both singular reference and truth conditions. He also has a negative
agenda, purporting to show, roughly, that the vocabulary of standard truth
conditional semantics is far too powerful to plausibly describe the linguis-
tic competence of mere human minds. In this paper, I explain some of the
basics of Pietroski’s compositional semantics and argue that his major ob-
jection to standard compositionality is inconclusive, because a similar ar-
gument can be mounted against his own minimalist theory. I argue that we
need a clear distinction between the language of the theorist—theoretical
notation—and the language whose nature we are trying to explain. The
theoretical notation should in fact be as expressively powerful as possible.
It does not follow that the notation cannot be used to explain mere human
linguistic competence, even if human minds are limited in various ways.
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1 Introduction
In his book, Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values (2018), Paul
Pietroski develops his own minimalist compositional semantics, based on only a
single compositional principle which takes every complex expression to encode
a monadic concept. This is hailed as a much more plausible theory of semantic
competence than alternative views that trade in an infinite number of expression
types and, usually, more than one principle of composition. The result is a robust
and serious internalist alternative to the existing externalist orthodoxy, which
Pietroski believes is too mired in the vocabulary of extensions, functions, and
truth conditions.
In this paper, I offer a very rough sketch of Pietroski’s positive proposal,
explaining what he takes meanings to be—namely, instructions—and how they
compose (Section 2). Next, in Section 3, I present his argument for thinking that
standard truth conditional semantics is far too powerful to be an appropriate
tool for describing semantic competence in normal human beings. I also describe
one of his arguments against function application as a compositional principle,
namely that it misrepresents monadic concepts as relations. According to Piet-
roski, the concept F (x) is not a function from objects to truth values—making
a monadic concept relational—but a mental device of classification, to classify
things as F. I argue, however, that the two proposals are either incomparable, or,
if they are made comparable, they may just as well turn out to be ontologically
and theoretically equivalent. This all depends on further commitments, not en-
coded in the mere notation for function application, which remain optional for
the truth conditional semanticist.
In Section 4, however, I argue that Pietroski’s own semantics would be sub-
ject to objections very similar to the ones he presents against truth conditional
semantics. Briefly, if we think of his own proposal in terms of basic syntactic
types and some function with those types as its domain, it is easy to see how his
proposal will generate a boundless number of new types. If this is right, Piet-
roski himself seems to assume compositional capacities that are, by his lights,
too powerful to be ascribed to finite human minds. I conclude, on the contrary,
that this shows that the argument itself is flawed. Roughly, the strength of the
notation used by the theorist is no guide to the actual metaphysical commitments
assumed in the theory itself. So, as before, I have failed to find a substantial cause
for disagreement between Pietroski and his alleged opponent.
Finally, in Section 5, I describe a distinction that might be of help in this
debate. This is the distinction between the representational system that the the-
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orist uses to explain and describe some cognitive phenomenon and the system
employed by the cognitive agent or agents under scrutiny. There are reasons
to think that, in principle, these cannot be identical. If so, we are free to take
truth conditional semantics, and Pietroski’s minimalist semantics, as competing
models of the same thing, rather than, say, attempted reproductions of what ac-
tually happens in humanminds. And this is the natural conclusion, showing that
comparing the two models may be even more difficult than Pietroski assumes.
2 Slang and Slanguages
Shaking his head over themanymeanings of ’language,’ Pietroski defines ’Slangs’
as naturally acquirable human languages. The languages of logic, mathematics,
musical notation, and so on, are not at issue. More precisely still, Slangs are con-
stituted by a collection of mental processes that determine sets of pronunciation-
meaning pairs. Presumably, sign languages are Slangs, so ’pronunciation’ must
also apply to the manner of producing sign expressions. Long ago, David Lewis
(1975) would have defined Slangs as the sets of pronunciation-meaning pairs
themselves, but Pietroski thinks this is a mistake. Still, we are all people of the
same trade; semanticists working to discover the nature of the meanings or in-
terpretations generated by the mental processes in question.
Pietroski’s enduring methodological commitment is to the mantle of compo-
sitionality. The only thing we know for certain about the semantic properties of
Slang expressions is that theymust, must compose. ComposableMeanings (CMs)
are then identified as instructions for fetching and assembling human concepts.
To see the point, it is best to think about what CMs cannot be. First, these mean-
ings are not human concepts. For example, if there is a human singular concept of
the person Pierre, this concept cannot be the Composable Meaning of the Slang
expression ‘Pierre.’ Second, CMs are not extensions. For example, if the exten-
sion of the human singular concept of Pierre is Pierre himself, this entity cannot
be the CM of ‘Pierre.’ Third, CMs are not instructions for how to use expressions
or pronunciations. For example, if the pronunciation /pierre/ ought to be used
to refer to Pierre, the instructions so to use it cannot be the CM of ‘Pierre.’
More positively, CM-semantics involves instructions which are both compos-
able and executionable by human minds. There are two kinds of instructions,
or mental processes, fetch-processes and assemble-processes. Fetching is sim-
ple. Take the polysemous Slang expression ‘book.’ The Composable Meaning
of ‘book’ is an instruction to fetch a concept stored at the ‘book’-address. Since
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‘book’ is polysemous, this particular address is home to more than one concept.
Say there are two ‘book’-concepts, one of books as concrete entities we can buy
or burn, another of books as abstract collections of information we can choose to
forget. If so, the CM of ‘book’ is an instruction with two admissible executions,
either to fetch the concept book:concrete or the concept book:abstract. To
understand the Slang expression ‘book’ on a given occasion, is to execute the as-
sociated instructions to fetch either of the two concepts stored at the appropriate
lexical address.
It is worth pausing to think about how meanings are being individuated on
this account. Strictly speaking, ‘book’ has only one meaning, because meanings
are instructions and the instruction for ‘book’ is to fetch a concept at a given
address in themental lexicon. The polysemy of ‘book’ consists in the fact that the
address is home to two concepts and, thus, executing the instructions on a given
occasion can have either of two end results. More natural, perhaps, would be to
say that meanings are constituted by sets of admissible instruction-executions.
That way, ‘book’ would have two meanings according to CM-semantics. Let’s
reserve the expression ‘recipes’ for ordered pairs of instructions and admissible
executions. Polysemous expressions are expressions with more than one recipe,
that is, more than one meaning. As we will see, I suspect that Pietroski must
insist that Composable Meanings are instructions and not recipes. And he might
very well be right.
A fewwords on fetching and assembling. To fetch a concept is a specificmen-
tal process which ranges over composable human concepts and is triggered by
atomic expressions like ‘red’ and ‘dot.’ The lexical addresses already mentioned
can only be home to composable concepts, not any old human concept. Further,
these concepts can either be monadic or dyadic, but not triadic or more. Well-
formed instructions to fetch a concept can themselves be composed to yield more
complex instructions. Complex instructions of this sort, encoded by molecular
expressions like ‘red dot,’ trigger the appropriate assemble-process. There are
two major processes of this sort, called M-join and D-join, the results of which
are unsaturated predicative concepts. So, assemble-processes take fetchable con-
cepts and either M-join them or D-join them. ‘Red dot’ is M-joined to yield the
concept red dot(_), applying to red dots. An expression like ‘above’ fetches a
dyadic concept, above(_, _)with two unsaturated argument places. This concept
may be composed with red dot(_)with the D-join operation, to yield a monadic
concept applying to whatever is above a red dot, roughly above red dot(_).
Two dyadic concepts cannot be joined, only two monadic ones or a monadic and
a dyadic one. And the result is always a composable monadic concept. Here I
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suppress a number of important details, for example about how exactly D-join
works, because they are not important for the points I wish to make.
I should stress that, for CM-semantics, it is entirely possible that humans
possess and regularly employ unfetchable and non-assembling natural concepts.
The Composable Meaning of ‘Pierre’ is an instruction to fetch a composable con-
cept at the ‘Pierre’-address. According to Pietroski, we better think of this as a
special monadic concept, pierre(_), applying to objects which are called ‘Pierre’
(p. 249). This is what makes the concept composable via the assemble processes
of M-join and D-join. Even so, the CM-semanticist can very well allow that hear-
ing the expression ‘Pierre’ uttered on a given occasion may come to activate an-
other concept in one’s mind, namely the singular concept pierre (p. 108). But
activation and fetching are not the same thing. Meanings may activate a number
of mental phenomena, some even regularly and reliably, but, still, these mental
phenomena will not be composable concepts.
Or, so the story goes at least. The Fodorians in the room might well wonder
what, if anything, can be meant by the idea of a concept that does not compose.
If there is a language of thought (‘Mentalese’), presumably it enjoys a composi-
tional semantics. So, if there is a singular concept of Pierre, the denoter-concept
pierre as it were, then it must compose with other concepts, like the concept
snores , to yield a proposition with a truth condition, being true if and only if
Pierre snores. If we think in a compositional Mentalese language—which, we
should remember, need not be a Slang—the theory of CM-semantics may ap-
pear inherently unstable. Put it this way, assuming that Mentalese contains the
purely denotational expression ‘Pierre’ whose content is exhausted by the in-
dividual, Pierre, and thus, that such Mentalese expressions must compose (for
Mentalese is compositional), why shouldn’t Slangs be able to contain such ex-
pressions too? If Mentalese-‘Pierre’ can fetch singular concepts—because they
are compositional—why can Slang-‘Pierre’ not do so as well?
Not to dwell too long on this point, I believe Pietroski would be best served
either to deny that there are any singular terms in the standard Kripkean sense,
or to deny that we think in a compositional language of thought. As far as I can
see, both may be sources of prevarication on his part. Understandably, as both
are non-negotiable for some theorists.
This is my rough sketch of Pietroski’s positive proposal, leaving out a lot of
fascinating detail, but he also has a more negative agenda. He argues that this
minimalist theory is in tension with standard possible worlds truth conditional
semantics and, further, that the latter was a bold conjecture best consigned to
the flames. In the next section I will focus on one particular argument in this
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vein, suggesting that it is inconclusive as it stands. First, however, I think it
may be helpful to state more flat-footedly what seems to be the real difference
between maximalist semantics—as we might call the alternative—and Pietroski’s
minimalism.
The minimalist rejects function application as a basic compositional prin-
ciple, putting in its place something more like predicate modification (assemble
processes). Both of these principles are tentatively endorsed in the standard text-
book of maximalist semantics (Heim & Kratzer 1998), where the elimination of
predicate modification is perceived as desirable but ultimately undoable. Heim
and Kratzer do not seriously consider the option of eliminating function appli-
cation. Pietroski’s contribution, among many other insights, is at least that of
presenting a robust theory on which only something like predicate modification
is assumed. Ultimately, however, I think one question is left hanging in the air:
Has it been shown, or even made plausible, that there would be a distinction at
the level of mental mechanisms between a system with maximalist psychology
and a system with a minimalist one? That is, is there any cognitively realized
distinction between systems characterized by the assemble function and those
characterized by function application together with predicate modification? As
far as I can see, but certainly Pietroski disagrees, these may well turn out to be
equivalent models of the same cognitive phenomenon, depending on the precise
commitments of the maximalist theory. If so, then, as I will argue in the next sec-
tion, we should stick to the more powerful theoretical vocabulary of maximalist
semantics.
Finally, more sweepingly, minimalists need stronger arguments to eliminate
extensions, truth conditions, truth values, and possible worlds from any semantic
theory, even their own. Pietroski does not rule out that Mentalese has a maxi-
malist semantics (pp. 84–85). But he needs to show that this is not the case
for, otherwise, the argument for having one type of semantics for both Slangs
and Mentalese come knocking. That’s not the only problem, however, because if
Slangs are used to activate Mentalese to, in turn, activate propositional attitudes,
the connection between the two seems far too tight to argue that Slang-‘Pierre’
does not function, somehow or other, to fetch or activate whatever Mentalese-
‘Pierre’ is supposed to fetch or activate. Minimalism can carve out semantic space
which excludes extension and truth conditions, but the carving itself does not
show that such phenomena do not exist or that they are irrelevant to the study
of meaning and content. To carve things up in this way is merely to insist that
meanings are instructions and not recipes, as these terms were defined above.
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2.1 The Fregean Hierarchy and Classification
Pietroski indeed presents one very ambitious argument of this sort. If sound, it
seems, it would establish precisely that neither Mentalese nor Slangs could pos-
sibly enjoy a maximalist semantics. The conclusion of the argument is, roughly,
that the notational machinery—specifically the Fregean Hierarchy of Types and
the lambda-calculus—in which maximalism is entwined, is far too powerful and
sophisticated to represent the mental processes of finite human minds. In what
follows, I focus on this argument, which, although impressive and intriguing, is
inconclusive.
Maximalist semantics is standardly introduced by defining so-called Fregean
or Montagovian semantic types (e.g., Dowty et al. 1981 , Heim & Kratzer 1998)
and Pietroski points out that the types are ‘boundlessly many’ (p. 127). The types
are defined recursively as follows:
(1) e is a type
(2) t is a type
(3) if a and b are types then 〈a, b〉 is a type
This definition represents an infinite class of syntactic or semantic categories.
It follows, for example, that 〈e, t〉, 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, and 〈〈t, t〉, 〈t, t〉〉 are all Fregean types.
Expressions of type e refer to objects like Pierre or Luang Prabang. Expressions
of type t stand for truth-values, True or False. Slang expressions like ‘snores’
are recursively defined functions from objects to truth-values. So, ‘snores’ is a
type of expression which takes (the semantic value of) an e-type expression and
outputs a truth-value. From this we get the intuitively correct result that ‘Pierre
snores’ is true if and only if the function encoded by ‘x snores’ outputs truth
when its argument place is assigned the object referred to by ‘Pierre.’
Pietroski points out that we can define levels of complexity for the Hierar-
chy of Types. (1) and (2) in the recursive definition is Level Zero. Level One
is defined as the set of possible functions 〈a, b〉 whose members a and b are at
Level Zero. So, Level One is 〈e, e〉, 〈e, t〉, 〈t, e〉, and 〈t, t〉. Each higher level is
defined in the same way, such that Level N builds types from all levels lower
than N. Level Zero has two types, One has four, and Two has thirty-two (for ex-
ample, 〈〈e, t〉, t〉). When we reach Level Four, we have more than two million
types. Many types at Levels Three and Four seem bizarre and are not realized,
Pietroski states, by human minds. But we certainly can define such types, and
some might be important in logic or mathematics, like the Fregean concept of an
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ancestral, which is Level Four (p. 128). Pietroski wants to conclude that Slangs
cannot be Fregean languages, because they are far too powerful to be realized
in the mind of every human who speaks a natural language. If this follows for
Slangs, it follows for Mentalese as well. Fregean thoughts are for Frege, not us
mere mortals.
Maximalists semanticists also use the extremely powerful lambda-calculus to
make good on their promise of a truth conditional semantics. As Pietroski shows,
the Fregean idea, which required Tarski’s notion of quantification over variant
sequences of objects, is to treat monadicity as a special case of relationality (p.
83). For example, the semantic value of ‘brown’ is a special kind of truth function
defined on the basis of lambda-abstraction, λx〈x is brown〉, mapping x to Truth
if x is brown and to Falsity otherwise. So, this is a function, roughly, taking one
set of objects to T and another set to F, determining sets of things satisfying a
certain condition, namely having the property of being brown. In principle, this
allows maximalists to model any Slang expression which is not of type e or t
as a mathematical function. This is implicit in the Fregean Hierarchy already
discussed, where ‘brown,’ for example, is an expression of type 〈e, t〉. But the
lambda-calculus is necessary to make this idea coherent and workable.
To the contrary, Pietroski argues, monadic concepts like brown(_) do not
represent functions at all, especially not a sophisticated lambda-function from
objects to truth-values. Rather, he claims, such concepts are classificatory; they
let us classify objects without relating them to truth values (p. 83). He explains
that there is a psychological distinction between relational and classificatory con-
cepts, the former are for ‘... classif[ying] things, into those that meet a certain
condition (e.g., being a rabbit) and those that do not. Anything that meets the
condition satisfies the predicate, which applies to anything that meets the con-
dition.’ (p. 28). Relational concepts, however, are ones like above(_, _), where
one object is related to another and the relation is satisfied when the objects are
in fact, in this example, related such that one is above the other. Pietroski’s point
is that brown(_) is simply not relational and thus it is misrepresented by the
Fregean theory.
But what is the difference exactly? If we tried to construct a creature whose
monadic concepts are non-relational because they are merely classificatory, what
would we get? It seems almost impossible to end up with anything other than a
relational concept in Frege’s original sense. This is because classifying things into
those with the property F and those that do not have the property F is equivalent
to classifying things into those that are truly judged to be F and those that are
falsely judged to be F. At least, that seems to be Frege’s position, as Sanford Shieh
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(2019) has recently tried to show in some detail. Briefly, Shieh’s interpretation
is that Frege believed that the truth of the thought that p is constituted by the
obtaining of what the thought represents. To recognize that the referent of ‘a’
falls under the referent of ‘is F ’ is thereby to recognize that the thought that a
is F refers to the True (2019, 108). If this is right, there is no difference at all
between classificatory concepts and Fregean concepts with a single unsaturated
argument place, indicated by ‘x is F ’ (Glanzberg 2014, 267 makes a related point
I think).
Still, I don’t think this objection is conclusive. What we would need is some
account of the difference between classifying and relating to truth values and,
in fact, I think there might be a plausible account of this sort. But it is not one
I can find in Pietroski and of course that might be my own fault. Anyway, very
roughly, if we hold that non-declarative clauses, like imperatives and interroga-
tives, do not relate objects to truth values, because they have no truth conditions,
then the properties or concepts occurring in those clauses must classify objects
without relating the objects to truth values. But the very same properties can
occur in declarative clauses too, and, so, we have something of puzzle. As I un-
derstand most proposals in the literature on imperative semantics, for example,
they ultimately model properties—even as they occur in imperatives—as func-
tions from objects to truth values (see, e.g., Roberts 2018). I hope to address this
issue in future work, so I leave it unresolved here.
As if by the law of gravity, this discussion is veering dangerously close to the
whole issue of the connection between logic and psychology, and Frege’s own
complicated view of that connection. The topic is too massive, controversial, so
we will mostly steer clear. But Pietroski writes that the relational conception
of monadic concepts, and the Function-Argument structure of thoughts more
generally,
. . . led to a brilliant conception of how thoughts could be logically
related. But like Frege, I don’t think it should be viewed as a psycho-
logical hypothesis, even if it can be viewed as a model for a certain
kind of ideal cognition. (p. 83)
It would seem, however, that Frege’s anti-psychologism is so staunch as to ex-
clude any psychologywhatsoever, nomatter howpowerful. His anti-psychologism
is driven by the conviction that logic is an autonomous science, not reducible to
(anyone’s) psychology. Thoughts are timelessly and mind-independently true or
false. Ditto, then, for the logical relationships between different thoughts (Frege
1918/1956).
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Still, undeniably, thoughts in Frege’s sense are relevant to psychology, be-
cause they are what we grasp, judge, and assert. Even more, they are what any
cognitive creature, ideal or not ideal, would grasp, judge, or assert, in trying to
discover true thoughts, which for Frege is the ‘work of science’ (Frege 1918/1956).
If ideal cognition discovers the true thought that p, and the truth of p consist in
the fact that a is F, then no one else can discover exactly the same thing without
recognizing that a is F. For Frege, a model of ideal cognition is a model of cog-
nition. So, if the Function-Argument structure reveals to us (the theorists) how
certain thoughts are related logically, we have also found out which particular
thoughts need to be grasped by anyone creditedwith recognizing those relations.
The structure itself would then seem to be theoretically indispensable.
Finally, the quote may help us better to diagnose the problem of distinguish-
ing classificatory and relational concepts. As Pietroski says, there is a sense in
which Frege does not intend the relational analysis as a psychological hypoth-
esis. What this means for Frege, I take it, is that the structure imputed on the
thought by the logician has no direct psychological relevance. That is, it does
not tell us anything about the nature of the mental acts of grasping, judging,
or asserting; except insofar as those acts are individuated in terms of their ob-
jects. More importantly, though, if the Fregean structure is not a psychological
hypothesis in this sense, then there is no tension between that structure and
any other structure, when it comes to human psychology. The relational con-
ception of monadic concepts, and monadic thoughts like a is F, can very well
model whatever it is that the classificatory conception models. At the level of
psychological mechanism, the two are equivalent. If both range over exactly the
same set of thoughts—if we are allowed the Fregean notion of a thought—they
are completely equivalent.
3 Notation and Expressive Power
Pietroski subscribes to the following methodological strategy:
In defending any proposal about meanings, one must also take care
to not assume implausibly powerful expression-generating capaci-
ties. Similarly, in defending any proposal about syntactic structures,
one must take care to not assume implausibly powerful operations
of semantic composition. (p. 294)
Surely, the counsel is sound. But how exactly do we judge degrees of power?
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And when we know how, will it really follow that Pietroski’s minimalism has the
right degree and maximalism not? My response to the first question is, one, that
at least it is not judged by the expressive power of the notation employed by the
theorist and, two, that any theory powerful enough to describe the basic range of
human semantic competence, has exactly the right degree of expressive power. It
may, still, lack explanatory power, which is a different matter. My response to the
second question is that, no, this particular line of argument against maximalism
is inconclusive, at least if both parties areworkingwith some distinction between
competence and performance.
There appear to be two notions of power in play here, productivity and com-
posability. A theory’s degree of productivity is determined by the number of
new items, or syntactic types, it can generate from some finitely stateable base
of principles. Generative theories of semantic competence are normally thought
of as generating a potential infinity of new items. The degree of composability,
however, is determined by the number of new items or types which can serve as
inputs into the compositionality function postulated by the theory. Presumably,
if the items are infinite in number, the domain of the compositionality function
will be infinite as well.
The primary virtue of Pietroski’s compositional principles is their simplicity.
The procedures modeled by these functions are dumb and can certainly be per-
formed by specialized cognitive mechanisms, rather than needing the resources
of a full-blown mind. But this virtue is shared by function application.
To see this more clearly, consider the productivity and composability implicit
in the notational systems we unhesitatingly, and rightly, employ in describing
the thoughts of young children. We posit that young children can represent the
thought that John thinks that cows are brown and that 2 + 2 = 4. In the first case,
we employ the incredibly powerful formula ‘A thinks that p.’ By simple recursion,
we will get ‘A thinks that B thinks that p.’ So, postulating thoughts about oth-
ers’ propositional attitudes involves notation which is infinitely productive and
boundlessly compositional. Similarly, in the second case, we employ the concept
of addition, symbolized by ‘+’. In particular, we attribute the thought that 2 +
2 = 4 to children well before they develop the capacities to represent numbers
higher than 100. If Pietroski is right, this should be a problem. The symbol ‘+’
is infinitely productive and boundlessly compositional and thus should not be
used to describe the thoughts of young children. But that would be the wrong
conclusion to draw.
Moreover, CM-semantics can be developed recursively as a Hierarchyof Types,
just like the maximalist theory (Pietroski mentions this possibility briefly on p.
Notation and Expressive Power 12
113). CM-semantics has two principles of composition, M-join and D-join, both
of whichwill havemonadic composable concepts as their outputs. InM-junction,
if Φ(_) and Ψ(_) are composable concepts then Φ(_)ˆΨ(_) is also composable.
Here ‘ˆ’ stands for the compositional process of conjunction, let’s call it ‘junction.’
In D-junction, if Φ(_) and Ψ(_,_) are composable concepts then Ψ(_,_)ˆΦ(_) is a
composable monadic concept, for example the concept for classifying things as
being above a red dot. A brown cow above a red dot would be an example where
the results of M-junction and D-junction are themselves joined by M-junction.
Let’s now define the Pietroskian Hierarchy by recursion:
(1) m is a type
(2) d is a type
(3) if a and b are types then (aˆb) is a type
Here,m stands for monadic concepts and d for dyadic concepts. The peculiar-
ities of junction (‘ˆ’) are important, as it behaves very differently from the set the-
oretic notion of an ordered pair employed by the maximalist. With that in mind,
if Level Zero of the Hierarchy is exhausted by m and d, Level One is exhausted
by the two types (mˆm) and (mˆd). Level Two is only slightly more complex, if
defined in terms of the number of added admissible junctions we can perform by
the junction of types at Levels Zero and One, e.g., [mˆ(mˆm)] and [(mˆd)ˆ(mˆd)].
As soon as we reach Level Three we have 56 types, Level Four has 2,212, and
Level Five has 2,595,782 types. We have clearly outstripped the finite cognitive
capacities of mere human minds. Still, Pietroski is happy to employ notation
which belongs to Level Four (p. 202), if interpreted as [(dˆm)ˆm]ˆ[mˆ(dˆm)]ˆm:
∃[agent(_,_)ˆal(_)]ˆchase(_)ˆpast(_)ˆ∃[patient(_,_)ˆtheo(_)]ˆgleeful(_)
This would be a proposed logical form for ‘Al chased Theo gleefully,’ making
explicit who is the chaser (agent) and who the chasee (patient). I have not ex-
plained Pietroski’s notion of existential closure, ‘∃,’ but it is needed to coordinate
one of the gaps in the d-type with the gap in the m-type. So, roughly, x is above
a red dot if there is a red dot y such that x is above y. Notice, also, that in CM-
semantics, juncture-processes are insensitive to order, so [(dˆm)ˆm] is equivalent
to [mˆ(mˆd)].
Why does Pietroski not see this as a problem for his minimalism? That is,
why does he assume that this form of argument is a blow to maximalism and not
to his own theory? I think there are two reasons which, although illuminating,
are inconclusive.
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First, in considering something like this point, Pietroski seems to assume
that (3) is not really true. That is to say, he believes CM-semantics has only
two syntactic types, m and d, and claims that all complex expressions would be
of type m. Therefore, there are no non-basic types in his semantics (p. 113). I
do not see how this could be true. Junction is a process or operation modelled
by a function. The value or output of the function is always an expression or
concept of type m, but that doesn’t mean that junction itself is of type m. That
would be like saying that 〈e, t〉-expressions are really t-type expressions, because
their output is always a truth-value. Rather, junctions are functional expressions,
whose domain could be defined as follows. Take the set D consisting of (i) all
items of type m, (ii) all sets m, d of items of type m and d, and (iii) the infinite
number of sets resulting from every possible combination and repetition of the
elements in (i) and (ii). Now remove every non-set from D, that is, delete the
element m. Next, take the set G of all items of type d and define the Cartesian
product of sets D and G, D×G (so we get, for example, {{m, d}, d}). Call the
resulting set F. At last, the junction-function is defined as a mapping from every
element in F to a set of expressions or concepts of type m. For example, this
function takes the pair brown(_) and cow(_) as input and yields the monadic
concept brown(_)ˆcow(_), which classifies things as brown cows. F contains
infinite sets, so it goes without saying that human minds are unable to apply
junction to every member of F.
Similarly, maximalist semantics really contains three types, e, t, and f, where
f is a function defined in terms of the first two types. CM-semantics contains
expressions of type m, d, and j, where j is a function from F to a set of m-types.
This way of looking at the matter is unavoidable, because otherwise we will
lack the resources to distinguish the composed conceptsΦ(_)ˆΨ(_) from the non-
composed composable concepts Φ(_). Both are indeed composable, but only the
former is composedwith the operation of junction. We can think of j as a function
from, for example, {{m, d}, m} to [(mˆd)ˆm], where the latter is itself a monadic
concept of a certain sort. If this is right, junction is both infinitely productive and
infinitely compositional. To be clear, I do not hold that this is a problem for CM-
semantics, to the contrary. My point is only to argue that if too much notational
power is a problem for maximalism, for the reasons Pietroski adduces, it is also
a problem for minimalism. The relative power of the notation is irrelevant to the
basic metaphysical questions at issue.
Second, Pietroski seems to shy away from relying explicitly on a distinc-
tion between competence and performance. But, certainly, some such distinction
must be working in the background. This could easily be applied to explain how
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CM-semantics can appeal to potentially infinite operations like juncture with-
out ascribing super-human cognitive powers to humans. Semantic competence,
as far as composable meanings go, is properly described in potentially infinite
terms, if the base is finitely stateable. If this strategy is available to the mini-
malist, however, it must also suggest itself to the maximalist. This would have
stopped the objection from too much notational power in its tracks. Maximalists
are free to argue that the only types ever required in actual linguistic perfor-
mance will remain below Level Four. Furthermore, large swaths of the types
represented at the Levels above Zero will never be used at all. Level One, for
example, would have it that there are expressions of type 〈e, e〉, which are not
needed for the semantics of Slangs.
When both theories—minimalism and maximalism—have access to a distinc-
tion between competence and performance, direct comparisons of degrees of
complexity become more cumbersome. Possibly, still, Pietroski’s formulation of
different Levels in the Hierarchy of Types could remain useful. But the compar-
ison would have to be between different analyses of one and the same sentence,
spelling out the varying operational power required by each analysis. How-
ever, if function application and classification are not really different operations,
which is still undecided I think, it is not clear which theory wins out on sim-
ple sentences. ‘Joe snores’ is an instruction to fetch two monadic concepts and
to M-join them. The resulting monadic concept classifies things into the set of
Joe-snoring elements and the set of non-Joe-snoring elements (objects, worlds,
or situations). For the maximalist, perhaps, it is an instruction to mentally fetch
Joe himself and apply the snoring-function to him, again dividing things into the
Joe-snoring elements and everything else. I must admit, in light of the number of
different theoretical commitments still open to both theorists, that I have a hard
time judging which theory involves more powerful mental operations. All I can
say is that focusing on individual sentence or clause types may make the project
tractable.
4 The Language of the Theorist
To recap, it seems more difficult to eliminate function application than Pietroski
assumes, for the notion is, at least potentially, equivalent to his own notion of
classification. We would need a story on which function application and classifi-
cationmust have different realizations inmentalmechanisms. Moreover, compo-
sitional semantics will always call for notation which is in principle boundlessly
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powerful, and a competence-performancedistinction to explainwhy only a small
part of those representational resources are needed to describe the facts of human
performance. Even CM-semantics traffics in notation which allows for boundless
productivity but, still, the theory is not exclusively concerned with ideal minds.
It is reasonable to conclude that the most powerful notation on offer is the
best one to go by, as long as we can find no hypotheses about cognitive imple-
mentations hidden in the notation itself. If so, the Fregean Hierarchy of Types
and the lambda-calculus are very good bets. Even if these are powerful, they can
be used to describe simple, dumb operations, like applying Fx to some object a,
in such a manner that the proposition entertained is true if and only if Fa.
As I have tried to argue elsewhere (see my 2016, 2019, and forthcoming), we
should make a distinction between the representational system employed by the
theorist to describe and explain the cognition and actions of particular human
agents, and the representational system employed by those agents themselves.
Human thinkers are often confused in ways that make it inadvisable to simply
incorporate their own representations into our explanations. Of course, these
representations can always be mentioned, quoted, or otherwise referred to, but
they cannot be used directly by the theorist. A simple example is a thinker who
confuses the identical twins Bill and Biff and has only a single concept, labeled
‘John,’ to represent both. Strictly speaking, the thinker then lacks the representa-
tional resources to think explicitly about Bill without thinking about Biff at the
same time. But still, I have argued, we must be able to ascribe the false belief
that Bill is identical to Biff to this agent. This must then be some form of implicit
belief.
An opposing view would be that, as theorists, we must be able to reproduce
or mirror the confused mental state in our theoretical vocabulary. Well, yes, we
must be able to refer to those mental states somehow, but we must also be able
to ascribe beliefs which the agent is constitutively unable to represent explicitly.
Stuart Hampshire (1975, 123) articulated these two options clearly: ‘Perhaps the
confusion in his mind cannot be conveyed by any simple account of what he
believes: perhaps only a reproduction of the complexity and confusion will be
accurate.’ So, either our descriptions are reproductions of the blooming, buzzing
confusion of our inner lives or they are, rather, models. But if wemust sometimes
posit the belief that p for purposes of explanation even when the explicit thought
that p is unavailable, we have in effect given up on reproductions.
CM-semantics is in business of providing a model of human minds, just as
much as themaximalist alternative. Maximalists can coherently accept any performance-
restriction that the minimalist cares to propose. For example, they could agree
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that human minds can only compose two unary relations or one unary and one
binary relation. Nothing in the notation itself disallows the restriction. The real
nub of the argument is whether we can find deep, metaphysical differences be-
tween conjunctive or predicative composition and function application. Even
if I lean one way on this issue right now, I genuinely think it is an open and
interesting question.
5 Conclusion
One of my underlying themes has been to suggest that, sometimes at least, ob-
jections against a compositional semantics for Slangs should also be objections
to the same compositional semantics for Mentalese. So, if the objection would
have absurd or unpalatable consequences for Mentalese, perhaps the objection
is not reliable in general. Thus, if the objection can be resisted for one of these it
can also be resisted for the other. It bears emphasizing, however, that this point
certainly depends on various assumptions, one of which is the very notion that
we think in a compositional Mentalese.
At one point, Pietroski argues that the Liar paradox is a problem for truth
conditional semantics (Chapter 4). Roughly, if my favorite sentence can be ‘My
favorite sentence is not true,’ standard truth conditional semantics will involve
contradictions. Pietroski wants to infer that truth conditional semantics should
go. If this is correct, it would suffice to prove that Mentalese cannot have a
truth conditional semantics either, because my favorite thought can be that my
favorite thought is not true. But it just seems too incredible to believe that our
thoughts cannot be true or false, and thus have truth conditions. Perhaps we
should conclude, then, that there is somethingwrong with thoughts or sentences
of this kind, not that neither thoughts nor sentences can be true or false.
The broader point is to suggest that the expressive power of our theoretical
vocabulary is not, as such, a reliable indicator of the explanatory power, or lack
thereof, of any theory expressed by that vocabulary. Working formal semanti-
cists tend to avoid making proclamations about where human linguistic compe-
tence ends and god-like mental powers would have to start. But surely, Pietroski
is correct to point out that Level Four in the Fregean Hierarchy of Types is not
needed to explain competence in Slangs. My argument is, basically, that one need
not be a CM-semanticist, that is, one need not eliminate function application, to
make this particular point.
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